From the Rolls-Royce experimental archive: a quarter of a million communications from Rolls-Royce, 1906 to 1960's. Documents from the Sir Henry Royce Memorial Foundation (SHRMF).
Critical memorandum on development policy, warning that past mistakes like those on the Peregrine and J-III projects could ruin the company.
| Identifier | ExFiles\Box 148\5\ scan0066 | |
| Date | 22th February 1935 | |
| -5- Hs{Lord Ernest Hives - Chair}/Rm.{William Robotham - Chief Engineer}16/KW. 22.2.35. that the time could hardly be more opportune for the delay necessitated by thorough development. If the car is wanted sooner, however, surely the policy should have been to have a less ambitious programme, not a shorter period of development. It is not satisfactory from our point of view that dissatisfaction should be shown over delay that in the light of all our previous experience can only be considered as absolutely inevitable. Briefly, therefore, we consider that our present position is due more to policy than to lack of technical organisation or ability. Technically we believe that we should concentrate on the essentials, and before laying down a specification for anything - particularly if much development work is required - ask ourselves, are we getting the maximum benefit for the customer for the minimum expenditure of our resources ? The great value of research to our mind is that it enables design to draw parts which it has been proved will give the results intended. We are not unduly depressed about the position of the SpectreCodename for Phantom III at present: we are really only having such troubles as we expected. It must be remembered that when it is finished it will represent a new breed of motor car as far as we are concerned, which can be scaled down for our other models. With regard to policy, we think we have time and again been over-ambitious in that we have light-heartedly discarded results of much development and design work because they only represented a certain amount of improvement. We feel that it is essential that our programmes should be more clearly defined, and it is only by limiting objectives that this can be accomplished. It only requires two or three more decisions such as those made on Peregrine and J-III to ruin the Company. How can we ensure in the future that these mistakes are not repeated ? Hs{Lord Ernest Hives - Chair}/Rm.{William Robotham - Chief Engineer} | ||